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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLAUDE A. CRAIG, 
Appellant. 
Homicide--Evidence.-The evidence in a murder case was not 
consistent with defendant's argument that he had intervened 
in an altercation between the deceased woman and a stranger, 
that he had fallen or stumbled on decedent's body and had 
thereby lost his hotel key, where he stated to other persons 
about two or three hours after the crime that he had beaten 
up a woman and that when he "hit them they stayed hit.'' 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Evidence.-The evidence in a murder case showed 
only second degree murder where, though the killing was ex-
tremely brutal, there was nothing to indicate premeditation, 
nothing to show that defendant had ever seen the victim before 
she approached him at an intersection other than the statement 
that he had "beaten up a woman," and nothing to show how 
the killing was accomplished or that it was committed eithe. 
in an attempt to commit rape or in the commission of rape, 
and where nothing more was shown than the infliction of 
multiple acts of violence on the victim. 
[3] Id.-Murder in First Degree.-In order to prove defendant 
guilty of first degree murder on the theory that it was com-
mitted in an attempt to commit rape or in the commission of 
rape, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that he had 
the specific intent to commit rape. 
[4] Id.-Evidence.-First degree murder on the theory that it was 
committed in an attempt to commit rape or the commission of 
rape was not shown by defendant's statements to a rehabilita-
tion center attendant, several hours before commission of the 
crime, that he wished he had a wife or girl and that he would 
like a "little loving," nor by his obnoxious behavior in a dance 
hall, shortly before the crime, when another woman refused to 
dance with him; such evidence merely showed a desire for 
feminine companionship. 
[5] !d.-Presumptions-Malice.--When a killing is proved to have 
been committed by defendant and nothing further is shown, 
the presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide,§ 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide,§§ 46, 51, 172; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§§ 304-, 307 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, ~ 145; [3] Homicide, 
§ 15(6); [4] Homieide, § 145(:-3). [5] Humicide, ~ 5~; [6, 7] Homi-
cid<", § 120; [8] Criminal Law, § 1404(15); [9] Criminal Law, 
§ 236(5). 
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murder; but the verdict should bo murder of the second de-
gree, not murder of the first 
!d.-Evidence--Condition of Deceased's Body.-Relevant evi-
dence of the condition of the deceased's body is admissible in a 
murder prosecution though it be gruesome and 
inflammatory, and cumulative on the 
proper. 
[7] !d.-Evidence--Condition of Deceased's Body.-Evidence as to 
the condition of deceased's as shown photographs, 
was admissible in a murder prosecution as relevant to intent, 
motive and the circumstances of the killing where the testi-
mony was far from clear the position of the body, 
the cause and nature of some of the injuries, and whether or 
not the body had been moved before or after death. 
[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Mis-
conduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-Though evidence of de-
fendant's prior conviction of rape was admissible in a murder 
prosecution and the jury was properly instructed as to the 
sole purpose of its admission, repeated references by the dis-
trict attorney, in his argument to the jury, to defendant as "the 
convicted rapist" and as the "rapist" and as having been con-
victed of rape were prejudicial insofar as degree of the crime 
was concerned, since they emphasized in the jurors' minds the 
thought that defendant might be guilty of rape, and it was 
doubtful whether an instruction that such argument was not 
evidence in the case cured the error; but such error did not 
require reversal where the conviction of first degree murder 
was reduced to second degree murder. 
[9J !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity at Time of Trial. 
-It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion by de-
fense counsel, following a verdict of guilty in a murder case, 
for a determination of the present sanity of defendant (Pen. 
Code, § 1368), though such motion was supported by an affi-
davit setting forth the belligerent conduct of defendant when 
a photographer tried to take his picture just prior to the 
court's instruction to the jury, and setting forth irrational com-
ments made by defendant that an insurance company was pay-
ing the district attorney money to convict him, that his ex-wife 
had tipped off the insuranee company, that his step-daughter 
had framed him, and the like, where the trial conrt observed 
him in court and on the witness stand and was apparently of 
the opinion that there was no doubt as to his present sanity. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the City and County of San Francisco. 
Walter Carpeneti, ,Judge. Judgment modified with directions. 
[6) See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 218 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 








~1. Momboisse and 
'rhomas C. Lynch, 
(San Francisco), and Jack Berman, Deputy 
for UC:,IJVH.U<OH 
CAR'l'ER, J.-Defendant, Claude A. Craig, was found 
guilty by a of the first degree murder of Helen Ivy 
and the punishment was fixed at death. On his plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the jury found him sane at the 
time of the commission of the crime. Defendant's motion for 
a new trial and for reduetion of the degree of the crime wa:s 
denied. The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239.) 
On November 6, 1956, the defendant registered at the Civic 
Center Hotel and occupied room number 537 to which he 
was given a key with that number on it. He had come to San 
Francisco from Fresno to receive medical treatnwnt for his 
back which had been injured. On the morning of November 
7th, defendant called at the May T. Morrison Rehabilitation 
Center where he stated to an attendant that he wished he 
were married and that he would like to have a girl because 
he would "like to have a little loving." On the evening of 
the 7th, defendant went to the Bohemian Gardens at 1600 
Market Street, where several times, he asked a woman cus-
tomer to dance with him. She refused and her last refusal 
was met by a torrent of abusive language from the defendant 
who called her a foul name and told her that if she did not 
dance with him she would find herself picking herself up off 
the sidewalk. While at the bar, defendant drank only beer 
and apparently remained sober. The evidence is in conflict as 
to just how many beers he drank-the patrons at the bar 
claiming he had about three and defendant himself that he 
had about 12. Defendant left the bar at about 2 a.m. with 
one Russell Martin with whom he walked up Market Street 
for about 20 or 30 feet. They then retraced their steps and 
crossed over to Franklin Street. Near the intersection of 
0.2d 
As Martin was woman, later identified as 
the Helen Ivy, Martin then apparently 
walked up Lily Street, or alley, in the direction from which 
the victim had come. Martin left the defendant standing 
at the Franklin-Lily intersection. 
The of Miss 7 o'clock on the 
wheels of which 
were jacked, or up, in a service station at the corner 
of and Franklin Streets across from the Bo-
hemian Gardens. She had been dragged some 
20-25 feet and the car under which t;h(> was lying and the 
one next to it were with blood. Miss Ivy was 
wearing a raincoat over a or slip and panties. 
The raincoat had been the nightgown or slip 
and the panties were torn open so that the front part of the 
body was exposed. She was lying on her back with her legs 
spread slightly apart. Her panties which had been torn open 
in the front were under her; her arms were in the sleeves of 
the coat. The victim had suffered multiple contusions and 
lacerations of the face, both breasts, and of the area around 
the breasts. She bad contusions or bruises of the neck with 
depressions in the skin. The skin of the lower abdominal area 
showed lacerations and there was a scuffing of the skin of the 
entire abdomen. The medical testimony shows that the "scuff-
ing" was probably the result of the body having been dragged 
across asphalt. Heel marks were found on the woman's mid-
chest area and others on the lower abdominal area. There 
were four such heel marks. The autopsy revealed a hemor-
rhage into the neck mnsclcR. fractured ribs on both sides; a 
lacerated lung, ruptured liver and subarachnoid hemorrhage 
of the brain. The record shows that the medical testimony 
was to the effect that although she could have died of the 
injuries to the brain, lungs or liver, her death was probably 
the result of strangulation around the neck. It was esti-
mated that it would have taken from 20 to 80 blows to inflict 
the injuries. A key to defendant's hotel room was found 
lodged in a fold of the clothing of the victim between her 
left arm and side. 
Defendant, who appeared to be under the influence of 
alcohol, was next seen about 4 :50 a.m. on November 8th at 
the office of the California State Railroad at Pier 27 in San 
Francisco. His hands were bloody, blood was spattered on his 
hat, coat, the bottom of his levi pants, and his face. When 
Nov. PEOPI,E v. CRAIG 
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asked one of the workmen at the what had happened 
to his hand which was and covered with blood, the de-
fendant that "I beat up a woman" and that when he 
hit them "they hit." The record shows that defendant 
returned to his hotel between 7 and 9 o'clock on the morning 
of the 8th without his hotel which he said he had left 
in a Defendant took off his coat and hat at the hung 
them on a nail and left them there. The blood on them was 
found to be A matched that of the 
victim. 
At 9 :45 on the morning of the 8th, defendant was at the 
Morrison Rehabilitation Center in an extremely agitated 
condition. His right hand was swollen and skinned as a 
result, he stated to an attendant, of a fall the preceding night. 
Defendant asked the attendant if she had read about the 
murder of a "fiuzzy" blonde in an alley the night before.* 
Defendant was arrested at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of 
the 8th. His right hand at that time was swollen and skinned, 
his right shoulder was bruised, his left knee was black and 
blue. In his hotel room, police found the shirt he had worn 
the previous night. It contained Type A blood. There was 
also blood on defendant's shoes, the heels of which correspond-
ed with the heel prints on the victim's body. There were no 
blood smears on the fly, back or top of defendant's shorts 
or levis. No evidence of a sexual attack was found on the 
body of the decedent; no evidence of semen or spermatazoa 
was found on either the clothing of the decedent or the de-
fendant. 
Defendant testified that he could not remember the events 
of the night of the crime; that he had been taking pills which 
he had bought without a prescription for the pain in his back 
caused by an injury he had previously suffered; that he didn't 
know how much he had to drink but that he drank only beer 
and that he had always been a "heavy drinker" when he once 
started. He also said he had been taking "medical shots" in 
Fresno to keep from going insane. The medical testimony 
showed that defendant was an emotionally unstable person; 
that he had had at least one period where he couldn't re-
member where he had been or what he had done; that he had 
difficulty in making decisions. 
*The San Francisco Examiner and the Chronicle did not carry the 
story of the murder that morning, and the San Francisco News and 
Call-Bulletin issues which carried the first account of the crime were 
not on the streets until after 10 o'clock. 
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is consistent with 
that he had intervened in an altercation between the decedent 
and a stranger, that he had fallen or stumbled on the de-
cedent's body and had thereby lost his hotel In view 
of the defendant's statements to the workers that he 
had beaten up a woman and that when he "hit them they 
stayed hit" this is without merit. 
[2a] The second contention is that the as a matter 
of law, shows only second degree murder. This contention is 
meritorious. The record shows a killing accomplished with 
great brutality, but does not show any premeditation. There 
is nothing to show that the defendant had ever seen the 
victim before she approached him where he was standing at 
the intersection of li'ranldin and Lily Streets other than the 
statement that he had "beaten up a woman"; neither is there 
anything to show how the killing was accomplished. It ap-
pears that the only other theory on which the jury could have 
found the defendant guilty of first degree murder was that it 
had been perpetrated in the commission of rape, or the at-
tempt to commit rape. The People contend that the torn 
clothing, the position of the victim's legs, and defendant's 
abusive conduct toward the woman who refused to dance 
with him as well as the statement made to the attendant at the 
Rehabilitation Center that he wanted a girl and that he would 
like "some loving" all tend to prove that the defendant either 
raped, or attempted to rape, his victim. It will be recalled 
that there was no other evidence to this effect-neither the 
defendant's, nor the victim's clothing bore any evidence of 
the sexual act. [3] In order to prove the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder on the theory that it was committed in an 
attempt to commit rape, or the commission of rape, it is in-
cumbent on the prosecution to prove that he had the specific 
intent to commit rape. (Pearle v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 
308 f309 P.2d 431] .) There was here, as distinguished from 
the Cheary case, no blood on defendant's trousers. other than 
at the cuff, and no blood on either the fly of his levis or shorts. 
Since other articles of defendant's wearing apparel were well 
spattered with blood and his hands cov;->rrd therewith, it would 
appear that had he raped the d0ceased, or attempt<?d to do so. 
the levis and shorts would have shown of blood. 'rhere 
is also a complete absence of any evidenc? in the record to 
show that he had an intent to commit rape. The record shows 
that the condition of the woman's clothing and her size when 
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in 
would tend to indicate a terrific struggle during 
which he had held her the front part of her coat and other 
the position of the victim's legs would tend to 
prove that rape had been eommitted rather than that defend-
ant intendeil to commit rape, and of this there was absolutely 
no evidence. the of the loses 
had been dragged 
some 20 to 25 feet. His statements to the Rehabilitation 
Center attendant that he wished he had a wife, or girl, and 
that he would like a 'little ' and his obnoxious be-
havior in the Bohemian Gardens when the woman refused to 
dance with him do not tend to show an intent to commit rape 
but show, merely, as the People admit, a desire for feminine 
[5] "When the killing is proved to have 
been committed the defendant, and nothing further is 
the prewmption of law is that it was malicious and an 
act of murder; but in such a (~ase the verdict should be murder 
of the second degree, and not murder of the first degree." 
(People v. Howm·d (1930), 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 
A.I.1.R. 1385]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 179 [163 P.2d 
8].) [2b] It appears that in the case at bar there is a 
total lack of satisfactory evidence that the killing was com-
mitted either in the attempt to commit rape or in the commis-
sion of rape; that the evidence shows no more than the in-
fliction of multiple acts of violence on the victim and that 
even though the killing was an extremely brutal one the People 
have proved only that the defendant was guilty of second 
degree murder (People v. Caldwell, 43 Cal.2d 864, 869 [279 
P.2d 539] ). 
[6] There was no error in the admission of the pictures of 
the deceased. In this case the pictures were clearly relevant 
to aid the jury in its determinations and attempt to recon-
struct the crime. As we said in People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 
120 [ 301 P.2d 582], "Relevant evidence of the condition of 
the deceased's body is wlmissible although it may be gruesome 
and possibly inflammatory. (People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879 
[186 P.2d 405]; People v. Guldbrandsen, 35 Cal.2d 514 [218 
P.2d 977] ; People v. Dunn, 29 Cal.2d 654 [177 P.2d 553) ; 
People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16 [279 P.2d 744]; People v. 
Cavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252 [282 P.2d 53] ; People v. Sutic, 41 
Cal.2d 483 [261 P.2d 241] .) And cumulative evidence on the 
subject may be proper (People v. Dunn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 
654, 659; People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423 [240 P.2d 590].) 
C.2d 
Here the evidence was 
avd the circumstances the 
added appreciably to the other evidence to the same effect." 
(Emphasis added.) In the ease at bar, the above quoted and 
emphasized sentence is particularly pertinent since the testi-
mony was far from clear concerning the position of the body, 
the cause and nature of some of the and whether 
or not the body had been moved before or after death. 
[8] Defendant contends that the district attorney was 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct in his argument to the jury. 
It is admitted that evidence of the defendant's prior convic-
tion for rape was admissible and that the jury was properly 
instructed as to the sole purpose for its admission. It is 
claimed, however, that the repeated references to the convic-
tion constituted prejudicial error. The record discloses that 
the district attorney referred to the defendant as "the con-
victed rapist" and as the "rapist" as well as referring to 
the defendant's conviction for rape some six times during his 
argument to the jury. In a car:e such as the one at bar, it 
would appear that these references were prejudicial insofar 
as the degree of the crime is concerned since it emphasized 
in the jurors' minds the thought that defendant might be 
guilty of rape. Defense counsel, however, objected only once 
and his objection then was to the effect that the prior con-
viction had "been argued many a time." Although the jury 
was instructed that argument of counsel was not evidence in 
the case, it is doubtful that the instruction cured the error. 
It is our opinion that the error here was so prejudicial as to 
constitute a miscarriage of justice within the rule announced 
by this court in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 
P.2d 243]. However, since the error affected only the degree 
of the crime, it does not require a reversal where the degree 
is reduced to that shown by the evidence. Inasmuch as de-
fendant's conviction of first degree murder rests entirely on 
the assumption that he either raped, or intended to rape, his 
victim it is apparent that the references to him as a "rapist" 
probably constituted the turning point in the deliberation of 
the jury. 
INSANITY TRIAL 
[9] After the verdict had been returned by the jury on 
defendant's plea of not guilty, defense counsel moved for a 
determination of the present sanity of the defendant. (Pen. 
Code, § 1368.) This motion was denied and defendant claims 
that the trial oourt was guilty of an abuse of discretion in 
Nov. PEOPLE v. CRAIG 
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the denial of his motion. The motion was supported by the 
affidavit of defense counsel (the deputy public defender) 
in which he sets l'orth the belligerent conduct of the defendant 
when a photographer tried to take his picture just prior to 
the court's instruction of the jury. At that time defendant 
attackefl newsmen, eourt attaches and a policeman and was 
restrained by handcuffing him throughout the instruction 
of the The affidavit also sets forth irrational comments 
made by the defendant some of which were to the effect that 
an insurance company was paying the district attorney some 
one or three thousand dollars to convict him; that his ex-wife 
had tipped off the insurance company; that his step-daughter 
had framed him. It is also averred that while the jury was 
being instructed, defendant made the following statements 
to the jury: "Give me the death penalty"; "I am not guilty. 
but give me the death penalty''; ''The insurance company 
has bought off the ,jury just like they have homicide." That 
other statements made by the defendant were: ''Take me back 
to jail. I don't like these people''; ''Where are my socks. 
There is no blood on them'' ; ''Why are they charging me 
with robbery¥ Someone must have robbed me'' ; ''The walls 
are closing in. l\fy head is only this big." (Indicating a small 
circle with his thumb and forefinger.) He also made state-
ments to the effect that his "brain was numb" and his ears 
were "hot." 
While the above statements taken out of context would 
tend to show that the defendant was mentally deranged, a 
reading of the record as a whole discloses no abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion. 
Although at times the defendant was profane, belligerent, and 
most uncooperative, the trial court observed him in court 
and on the witness stand and was, apparently, of the opinion 
that there was no doubt as to his present sanity. 
The judgment of the trial court of first degree murder is 
modified and the cause remanded to the trial court with 
directions to enter judgment against defendant finding him 
guilty of second degree murder and thereupon to pronounce 
judgment upon him as prescribed by law. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
A reading of the record leaves no doubt that defendant 
killed Helen Ivy and the majority concedes that "the killing 
49 C.2d-11 
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brutal one.'' The reaches the 
that "there is a total lack satisfactory 
evidence that the killing was committed ... in the attempt 
to commit rape. . .. " I cannot agree with that conclusion. 
In my opinion, there was substantial evidence to show that 
the murder was committed in an attempt to commit rape. 
(People v. 48 Cal.2d 546-547 [310 P.2d 969] ; 
People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 378 [260 P.2d 1]; People v. 
Gutierrez, 35 CaL2d 726-727 P.2d 22]; People v. 
Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 792 [161 P.2d 227].) I find no 
prejudicial error in the record and would therefore affirm 
the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 26, 1957. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 24090. In Bank:. Nov. 5, 1957.] 
ALICE F. ROZAN, Respondent, v. MAXWELL M. ROZAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Oonil.ict of Laws-Personal Property.-Marital interests in 
movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law 
of the domicile at the time of their acquisition. 
[2] !d.-Personal Property.-The interests of spouses in movables 
do not change though the movables are taken into another 
state or are used to purchase land in another state. 
[3] Divorce-Evidence-Residence.-A finding in a divorce action 
that the spouses established their residence in the state not 
later than July of 1948 was sustained by evidence that they 
resided in another state until May of that year; by the wife's 
testimony that, after learning she was pregnant, they decided 
[1] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur., Con-
flict of Laws, § 65 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 66; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 248. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Conflict of Laws,§ 18; [3) Divorce, 
§ 101; [4, 5, 9, 10] Husband and Wife, § 200; [6] Husband and 
Wife, § 48; [7] Husband and Wife, § 69; [8] Divorce, § 234(2); 
[11) Courts,§ 26; [12] Equity,§ 7; [13] Judgments,§ 474; (14, 15] 
Divorce, § 132. 
